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LET THE JUDGE SPEAK: RECONSIDERING
THE ROLE OF REHABILITATION IN
FEDERAL SENTENCING
MADELINE W. GORALSKI†
INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are a judge in a criminal case. The trial is
over, and the defendant, Jamie, was convicted of a serious
drug-related crime, her second conviction for similar crimes.
Previously, she served the United States Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) maximum sentence of eighteen months.
Today is her sentencing proceeding for the most recent
conviction. You feel very strongly that imprisonment is the
proper punishment for Jamie in this case. However, you are
unsure as to how long the term of imprisonment should be.
Suppose the maximum sentence for this crime, according to the
Guidelines, is twenty-four months. You believe that two years is
a sufficient punishment due to the severity of the crime and the
fact that it will keep Jamie from committing similar crimes
during her incarceration. The twenty-four-month sentence might
even send a message to others in society that these drug crimes
can lead to long periods of imprisonment, and you hope that the
sentence will deter others from following in Jamie’s footsteps.
However, Jamie’s past conduct has shown that she poses a high
risk of recidivism. At a nearby prison facility, there is a highly
regarded rehabilitation program that helps defendants overcome
drug problems and gives them vocational training so that they
can get jobs when they are released from prison. The problem for
Jamie, and for you, is that this program requires thirty-two
months to complete and the United States Supreme Court, in
Tapia v. United States,1 interpreted § 3582(a) of the Sentencing
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1
131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
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Reform Act to mean that promoting rehabilitation cannot be a
factor justifying an increase in the length of a criminal
defendant’s term of imprisonment.2 Therefore, even if you
believe that her rehabilitative needs should be factored into
Jamie’s sentence, you cannot say anything about those needs at
the proceeding for fear of offending Tapia.
Judges today are faced with this problem on a regular basis.
Many defendants would benefit from the rehabilitative programs
offered in prisons, but because of the prohibitive language in
§ 3582(a) of the Sentencing Reform Act,3 defendants like Jamie
are released from prisons without undergoing any type of
rehabilitation and then fall back into their criminal ways.
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) was passed
during an ideological shift towards conservatism within the
government and in the wake of several studies that suggested
the rehabilitative system used in prisons during the majority of
the twentieth century was flawed because it did not achieve its
goal of reducing the risk of recidivism among defendants.4
Section 3582 deals with sentencing a defendant to a term of
imprisonment.5 It states that rehabilitation cannot be considered
when imposing such a sentence and instead allows judges to
consider only the other goals of punishment—deterrence,
incapacitation, and retribution—when choosing to send a
defendant to prison.6
In 2011, the Supreme Court attempted to resolve a split of
authority among the circuit courts concerning the interpretation
of § 3582(a) when it decided Tapia v. United States.7 There, the
Court ruled that a violation of the statute occurs if a judge
lengthens a defendant’s sentence of imprisonment solely to
promote the defendant’s rehabilitation.8 Though this decision
resolved the original split, it led to another concerning whether
or not Tapia permitted a small degree of consideration of

2

Id. at 2392.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012).
4
Michael Vitiello, Reconsidering Rehabilitation, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1011, 1033–34
(1991). See generally Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers
About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT. 22 (1974).
5
18 U.S.C. § 3582.
6
Id. § 3582(a).
7
131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
8
Id. at 2392.
3
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rehabilitation or if § 3582(a) and Tapia together constituted a
complete ban on rehabilitation factoring into the decision as to
the length of a defendant’s prison sentence.
A look back at the reasons why rehabilitation was
abandoned as an important consideration in sentencing a
defendant to prison reveals several glaring flaws in the rationale
for the move.9 Recent studies and opinions indicate that there
are significant benefits to rehabilitation in prisons for the
defendant as an individual and for society as a whole.10 Thus, it
might be time to revisit the language of § 3582(a) and let
rehabilitation play at least a minimal role in sentencing a
defendant to prison.
This Note contends that the importance of rehabilitation as a
valid and necessary principle of punishment is overlooked in
§ 3582(a) of the SRA and further argues that a judge should be
permitted to consider rehabilitation when deciding to sentence a
defendant to a term of imprisonment, so long as rehabilitation is
not a dominant factor in coming to that decision. Part I outlines
the principles of punishment and the rise and decline of the
rehabilitative system of punishment in the United States. It also
discusses the importance of rehabilitation and how society could
benefit from a system that does not leave rehabilitation by the
wayside. Part II discusses the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tapia
v. United States11 and the resulting circuit split concerning the
degree to which rehabilitation can be considered when
sentencing a criminal defendant to a term of imprisonment in
accordance with § 3553(a)(2)(D) and § 3582(a) of the SRA.
Finally, Part III recommends that the Supreme Court resolve the
circuit split by adopting the Fifth Circuit’s additional justification
and dominant factor tests, or alternatively, that Congress amend
§ 3582(a) so as to permit judges to consider and talk about
potential rehabilitation, without fear of being overruled for such
discussions, when sentencing a defendant to prison.

9
Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1032–34; Michael Welch, Rehabilitation: Holding its
Ground in Corrections, 59 FED. PROBATION 3, 5 (1995).
10
Id.
11
131 S. Ct. at 2392.
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PUNISHMENT IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

Principles of Punishment

When a person is charged and convicted of a crime under the
laws of the United States, a judge then sentences that person to a
punishment so that the defendant is forced to suffer a
consequence for that defendant’s actions.12 The Sentencing
Reform Act under 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) permits a person found
guilty of a punishable offense to be sentenced to (1) a term of
probation, (2) a fine, or (3) a term of imprisonment.13 One or
more of the four common justifications for these punishments—
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation—can
rationalize the consequences an individual has to endure as a
result of committing a crime.14
Retribution is the idea that “punishment is justified when it
is deserved.”15 A retributivist looks backward in time and
decides if a person deserves punishment based on the
wrongdoer’s past choices.16 For retributivists, the focus is on the
past and the belief that a criminal should be punished whether or
not the punishment will result in a later reduction of crime.17
The principle behind retributivism is that a wrongdoer, or
defendant convicted of a crime, should be punished because they
used their free choice to act in a certain way, and in doing so,
violated the rules of society.18
To the contrary, a person who sees punishment from a
utilitarian perspective looks to the future at what effects the
punishment will have on society and on the defendant.19 A
utilitarian believes in the idea of the greatest good for the
greatest number of people; therefore, the pain stemming from
punishment can be justified if and only if it results in a reduction
12

JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 2.02(A) (6th ed. 2012).
18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (2012). All of these forms of punishment are subject to the
provisions of § 3553 of the Sentencing Reform Act (“SRA”) and to various other
subchapters in the SRA. See generally id. §§ 3551–3586.
14
Andrea Avila, Note, Consideration of Rehabilitative Factors for Sentencing in
Federal Courts: Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011), 92 NEB. L. REV. 404,
406 (2013).
15
DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 2.03(B)(1).
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. § 2.03(A)(1).
13
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of future crime and pain.20 The four utilitarian justifications for
punishment are general deterrence, individual deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation.21
Deterrence is the first utilitarian justification for
punishment. The idea behind both general and individual
deterrence is to stop individuals who might have the inclination
to commit a crime in the future from doing so because they are
aware of the punishments that criminals who committed similar
crimes were subjected to.22 General deterrence is meant to
convince the general community or society to refrain from future
criminal conduct and individual deterrence serves the same
purpose for those who have already committed a crime.23 The
punishments should be severe enough so as to intimidate
defendants and make it so they do not want to endure those
Critics of deterrence as a
punishments a second time.24
justification for punishment cite the high rates of recidivism in
the United States25 as evidence that deterrence has served no
purpose in reducing crime.26 However, proponents argue that
there is no way to know what crime rates would be without
punishment, and therefore, there is no statistically accurate way
to determine if punishment is serving as a deterrent to crime.27
Incapacitation, the second utilitarian justification for
punishment, is tied to specific deterrence in that it focuses on the
individual who committed the crime and how that person’s
incarceration can benefit society.28 The justification behind
incapacitation is that while the defendant is being punished, the
defendant is prevented from committing more crimes because of
isolation from society during the period of punishment.29 The
theory of incapacitation is criticized because it is a very limited
20

Id.
Id. § 2.03(A)(2).
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
“For example, of a selection of persons released from prison in 1994, an
estimated 67.5% were re-arrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor within three
years, 46.9% were reconvicted, and 25.4% were resentenced to prison for a new
crime.” Avila, supra note 14, at 407 n.27.
26
Id. at 407.
27
Id.
28
DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 2.03(A)(2).
29
Id. This justification for punishment specifically applies to punishment in the
form of imprisonment. Id.
21
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solution to the problem of criminal conduct within society; future
criminal conduct is difficult to predict and most prisoners will be
released eventually.30
Rehabilitation, the final justification for punishment, focuses
on the individual defendant but also results in benefits for society
as a whole. The effectiveness of rehabilitation has been debated
a great deal during the latter half of the twentieth century and
continues to be a topic of much discussion today.31 The goal of
rehabilitation is similar to that of the other utilitarian principles
of punishment: to reduce future crime.32 The idea behind
rehabilitation stems from the assumption that people who
commit crimes are suffering from a sickness that can be cured
with the proper treatment.33 Such treatment can come in the
form of mental or psychiatric care, educational or vocational
training, or drug and alcohol treatment programs.34 Advocates of
rehabilitation as a consideration in punishment believe that it is
a more favorable form of punishment than one based on scaring
the defendant into behaving in accordance with societal norms.35
Proponents are quick to point out that the idea of redemption,
which is at the heart of rehabilitation, reflects the
Judeo-Christian values that the United States was founded
upon.36 However, rehabilitation has numerous critics who point
to studies that suggest the rehabilitation efforts used in prisons
for a great deal of the twentieth century did little to reduce
recidivism.37
B.

History of the Rehabilitative System

Throughout the history of the United States, there have been
many theories of punishment and methods for bringing those
theories into practice. The rise and decline of the rehabilitative
system of punishment are the hallmarks of the twentieth century
in regards to sentencing and the prison system.38 The early
30

Avila, supra note 14, at 407.
Id. at 407–09.
32
DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 2.03(A)(2).
33
Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1012.
34
DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 2.03(A)(2).
35
Id. § 2.04(A)(2).
36
Id.
37
Id.
38
Shanna L. Brown, Comment, Sentencing and Punishment—Sentencing
Guidelines: The Sentencing Reform Act Precludes Courts from Lengthening a Prison
31
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1900s saw the establishment of the federal parole system,
authorizing the use of indeterminate sentencing in which the
judge, Congress, and a parole board each played a role in
determining the length of a defendant’s sentence.39 This model
developed over time into the “medical model” of the 1950s.40
Under the medical model, rehabilitation as a principle of
punishment focused around the idea that criminality, or the
tendency to commit crimes, is a disease that can be treated
through programs run as part of the prison system.41 When
defendants were sentenced under this system they were
classified in a state “diagnostic center” and placed into a
treatment program designed to reduce their risk of recidivism
upon release from prison.42 The Federal Bureau of Prisons
(“BOP”) provided specialized programs for inmates that focused
on a variety of areas, ranging from drug and alcohol treatment to
educational and behavioral adjustment programs.43
Despite lasting for over two decades as the dominant
justification for imprisonment as a form of criminal punishment,
influential studies conducted and published in the 1970s cast
some doubt on the effectiveness of rehabilitation in prisons,
suggesting that the rehabilitative ideal—every criminal can be
The critics of
cured—might not be an achievable goal.44
rehabilitation argued that rehabilitation simply did not work
because it was philosophically unsound and led to greater
inequality.45 There was evidence that because the rehabilitative
model required completion of the treatment programs to be
considered effective, some prisoners were serving significantly
longer sentences than others found guilty of the same crime.46
Some studies claimed that since the rehabilitative model had

Sentence Solely To Foster Offender Rehabilitation, 87 N.D. L. REV. 375, 382–84
(2011).
39
Id. at 382.
40
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 382–83.
44
See e.g., Martinson, supra note 4 at 23–25 (discussing the results of one of the
most famous studies conducted during that time period). Martinson’s article was
later known as the “nothing works” article. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1032.
45
Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1032.
46
Id. at 1025.
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taken full effect the prison population had doubled, a clear
indication that the goal of reduction in crime was not being
achieved.47
At the same time that the flaws in the rehabilitative system
were beginning to show, the United States government started
making an effort to demonstrate its power in the aftermath of the
unstable social movements during the 1960s.48 As a result, the
government took a “tough on crime” stance, leaning away from
the liberal rehabilitation model and, in effect, making those who
still supported the model seem like soft on crime bleeding
hearts.49 There was a concern, even among judges themselves,
that the indeterminate and rehabilitative system of sentencing
left judges and parole boards with almost unchecked power when
it came to sentencing and imprisoning criminal defendants.50
This broad discretion led to a discrepancy in sentences that
seemed to be at odds with the idea of equality, one of the most
important and fundamental goals in the American system of
government.51 These fears, accompanied by the ideological shift
from soft-hearted liberalism to hard-fisted conservatism, led to
an acceptance of a retributive model of punishment that
culminated in the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984.52
C.

The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Rehabilitation

The problems with federal sentencing and the rehabilitative
model were brought to the attention of Senator Edward M.
Kennedy by Judge Marvin E. Frankel53 of the Southern District
47

Id. at 1030–31.
Welch, supra note 9.
49
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) Some liberals even joined the
conservative movement, citing the just deserts, or retributivist, model as the ideal
form of punishment for someone who committed an act that is considered inherently
wrong. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1024.
50
Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative
History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 228
(1993).
51
Id. at 227.
52
Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1015; Welch, supra note 9; Brown, supra note 38, at
386.
53
Judge Frankel, a former Columbia law professor and fifteen-year member of
the federal bench in the Southern District of New York, advocated for sentencing
reform because he found the sentencing powers he possessed as a judge to be “almost
wholly unchecked and sweeping” and “terrifying and intolerable for a society that
professes devotion to the rule of law.” Stith & Koh, supra note 50 (quoting MARVIN
48
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of New York and by members of a Yale University sentencing
seminar.54 Both Judge Frankel and the members of the Yale
seminar voiced their heavy criticism of the current sentencing
system and made recommendations to Senator Kennedy.55 In
response, Senator Kennedy introduced Senate Bill 2966, a
sentencing reform bill, in 1975.56 This first bill was criticized
because it did not clearly define the goals of sentencing, and
therefore, it did not pass.57 The following years saw several
different bills calling for the restructuring of criminal sentencing,
but each attempt failed to pass both houses.58 After nine years of
debate, the House and the Senate finally passed the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984, which imposed a determinate sentencing
system focused on the four principles of punishment.59 In the
Senate Report that accompanied the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984 (“SRA”), Congress indicated that it believed the
indeterminate sentencing model had failed, calling the pre-1984
model “ ‘coercive’ rehabilitation” and stating, “We know too little
about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate individuals on a
routine basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a
particular prisoner has been rehabilitated.”60
The SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission
(“Commission”) which acts pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 99461 and is
part of the judicial branch of the federal government.62 The
E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1972)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
54
Brown, supra note 38, at 384–85. “Each month, members of this seminar
would meet and discuss the problems with the current sentencing scheme and make
recommendations for reform. The monthly sessions culminated in a book, which
included a detailed proposal for the creation of sentencing guidelines and the
creation of an independent sentencing commission.” Id. at 384 (footnote omitted).
55
Stith & Koh, supra note 50, at 228–30; Brown, supra note 38, at 384–85.
56
Brown, supra note 38, at 384–85.
57
Id. at 385.
58
Id. at 385–86. For example, Senate Bill 1437, introduced again by Senator
Kennedy along with Senator John McClellan, placed a clear prohibition on
considering rehabilitation when imposing a term of imprisonment, but the bill did
not pass because it lacked a discussion of the four primary philosophies behind
punishment in the criminal system. In contrast, House Bill 6915 permitted the
consideration of rehabilitation as a goal of sentencing but said it could not be a
primary factor in deciding whether or not to incarcerate the defendant. Id.
59
See id.
60
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 40 (1983).
61
28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012).
62
Brown, supra note 38, at 387. The United States Supreme Court validated the
authority of the Sentencing Commission in 1989:
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Commission helped create a determinate sentencing model to
combat the pervasive sentencing disparity that was at issue
under the indeterminate rehabilitative model.63 The Commission
was charged with creating the United States Federal Sentencing
Guidelines (“Guidelines”) which set out the appropriate
kind—probation, fine, or term of imprisonment—and range of
punishment for each category of criminal offense.64
When the Guidelines were first promulgated, there was
debate about whether they should be considered mandatory.65 In
United States v. Booker,66 the Court held that making the
Guidelines mandatory would violate the Sixth Amendment’s
right to a jury trial.67 This ruling stripped the SRA of its
mandatory nature but kept the majority of the statute intact,
ruling that the Guidelines were advisory for sentencing judges.68
Under Booker, sentencing judges are permitted to deviate from
the range set forth in the Guidelines if there are particular
mitigating factors, but judges must explain their reasons for
deviating from the Guidelines recommendation.69
Despite the advisory nature of the Guidelines, there is still
robust debate in federal courts concerning the interpretation of
certain sections of the SRA. Two such sections are § 3553(a)(2)
and § 3582(a), both of which deal with the principles of
punishment.70 The debate concerns the seemingly conflicting
language in those sections regarding the permissibility of a judge
considering rehabilitation when contemplating imposing a prison

The Constitution’s structural protections do not prohibit Congress from
delegating to an expert body located within the Judicial Branch the
intricate task of formulating sentencing guidelines consistent with such
significant statutory direction as is present here. Nor does our system of
checked and balanced authority prohibit Congress from calling upon the
accumulated wisdom and experience of the Judicial Branch in creating
policy on a matter uniquely within the ken of judges.
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
63
See Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1028.
64
28 U.S.C. § 994; Brown, supra note 38, at 387.
65
See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
66
Id. at 226.
67
Id..
68
Id. at 245.
69
Id.; Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1027.
70
18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2), 3582(a) (2012).
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sentence and what the length of that sentence should be.71
Section 3553(a)(2) lays out the goals of punishment in the federal
system:
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
shall consider . . . the need for the sentence imposed[] to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense; to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; to protect the public
from further crimes of the defendant; and to provide the
defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner . . . .72

In effect, § 3553(a)(2) calls for sentencing judges to consider
retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation when
sentencing defendants.73 Dispute has arisen, however, when
judges and lawyers compare § 3553(a)(2)(D), permitting
rehabilitation as a factor to be considered during sentencing,
with § 3582(a), dealing with imposing a term of imprisonment.
Section 3582(a) provides, “The court, in determining
whether . . . a term of imprisonment is to be imposed, in
determining the length of the term, shall consider the factors set
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,
recognizing that imprisonment is not an appropriate means of
promoting correction and rehabilitation.”74
In grappling with how these two seemingly contradictory
sections work together, it is first necessary to examine what the
legislature intended when it dealt with the issue of
rehabilitation, a system it was trying to leave behind, when
passing the SRA. The Senate Report was clear that the “caution
concerning the use of rehabilitation as a factor to be considered
in imposing [a] sentence is to discourage the employment of a
term of imprisonment on the sole ground that a prison has a
program that might be of benefit to the prisoner.”75 This
statement indicates that Congress was wary of the rehabilitative
model of punishment but did not direct that it should be
abandoned altogether.76 For example, § 3582(a) only applies to a
71
72
73
74
75
76

Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a).
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119 (1983).
Brown, supra note 38, at 386.
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sentence for a term of imprisonment, not to the other available
types of punishment; therefore rehabilitation can be considered
when determining the defendant’s overall sentence.77
Additionally, the Senate Report was clear that judges could still
consider the availability of rehabilitation programs when
considering which facility to recommend a defendant be sent to.78
When it comes to rehabilitation and its role in sentencing a
defendant to a term of imprisonment, a reading of the Senate
Report demonstrates that, under the SRA, rehabilitation cannot
be the sole factor considered when sentencing a defendant to a
term of imprisonment.79 However, courts around the country
disagree as to whether the move away from the rehabilitative
model was effective.80 This led to a debate about whether the ban
on considering rehabilitation under § 3582(a) also applies when a
judge determines the length of the term of imprisonment.81
D. Flaws with the Rationale of the 1970s—Why Rehabilitation
Works
The rationale behind the movement away from rehabilitation
as a goal of punishment in prisons was flawed in several ways.
The initial impetus for the antirehabilitation movement stemmed
from an article written by Robert Martinson entitled “What
Works,” which quickly became known as the “nothing works”
article.82 Martinson believed that rehabilitation in prisons had
no identifiable effects on the rate of recidivism among former
inmates.83 However, after his original work gained a great
degree of fame and was cited during the numerous discussions
advocating for a move away from rehabilitation, Martinson wrote
a second article essentially denouncing his findings from the
“nothing works” article as inherently flawed.84 Using a new
research method, Martinson was able to determine to what

77

18 U.S.C. § 3582(a); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 76–77.
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119.
79
Id. at 76–77, 119; Brown, supra note 38, at 386.
80
See infra Part III.
81
See Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011).
82
See generally Martinson, supra note 4. See also Vitiello, supra note 4, at
1032–33.
83
Martinson, supra note 4, at 25; see Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1032–33.
84
Vitiello, supra note 4. at 1033–34. See generally Robert Martinson, New
Findings, New Views: A Note of Caution Regarding Sentencing Reform, 7 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 243 (1979).
78
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degree certain combinations of treatment, coupled with other
conditions, would produce a less likely chance that a defendant
would commit a crime a second time.85
In addition to the flawed research techniques used in the
“nothing works” article, the circumstances of the time period and
the resources available in the prisons may have led to inaccurate
conclusions about the effectiveness of rehabilitation in prisons.86
Proponents of rehabilitation attribute the ineffectiveness of such
programs during the middle and latter part of the twentieth
century to staff problems and the lack of funds available to
federal prisons to implement the necessary programs.87 The staff
and funding limitations placed on prisons made it difficult, if not
impossible, for the rehabilitation programs, which were meant to
reduce rates of recidivism, to be executed to their fullest extent.88
Therefore, the problem in the 1970s was not that rehabilitation
in prisons was not working; it was that the system was not
equipped with the proper resources to allow these programs to
reach their full potential.
One of the main arguments against rehabilitation as an
effective form of punishment stems from the idea that
rehabilitation entails forcing an offender to become prosocial.89
In response to these arguments, proponents of rehabilitation as a
form of punishment argue that “[a]lthough reformation may not
be possible in all circumstances, . . . it will often work if society is
prepared to commit the necessary resources to the process.”90
The proper resources and dedication to the rehabilitative process,
advocates contend, would fix the problems that led to the demise
of the rehabilitative system in the first place.91 In addition, there
is a valid argument for rehabilitation in the idea that the initial
85

Martinson, supra note 84, at 244; Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1033.
Welch, supra note 9, at 4.
87
Id. at 5–6.
88
Id. at 4, 6.
89
Id. at 3–4. Conservatives are skeptical about the idea that individuals’
tendencies to turn to criminal conduct stems from the social conditions in which they
were placed. This also leads to a concern about the effectiveness of the treatment
received during a term of imprisonment. Some argue that while defendants may
leave prison after completing rehabilitative programs as people less likely to commit
crimes, when they return to their old lives, that progress will be washed away
because defendants will find themselves back in the same circumstances that led
them to commit crimes in the first place. Id.
90
DRESSLER, supra note 12, § 2.04(A)(2).
91
Id.
86
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high costs of implementing effective rehabilitation programs
would create future savings.92 By putting forward the money for
prison programs aimed at rehabilitating defendants now, society
would save money on court costs and the cost associated with any
potential future imprisonment of a recidivist defendant.
Rehabilitation is also important because it is the only
principle of punishment that considers the defendant’s needs and
welfare rather than just the needs and preservation of society.93
Incapacitation, deterrence, and retributivism all look at the effect
of the defendant’s crime and punishment on society, while
rehabilitation looks to help the defendant overcome whatever it
was that caused the defendant to be inclined to commit a crime
in the first place. In the prison system, as opposed to the system
of punishment considered by Congress and the courts when
determining the laws and reasons behind sentencing,
rehabilitation is seen as a valid goal.94 The consideration of
defendants’ needs lends a sense of humanity to the correctional
system that does not exist when the sole reason for sentencing
defendants to imprisonment is to lock them away for a
predetermined period of time.95
These arguments all support the idea that the importance of
rehabilitation when sentencing a defendant to a term of
imprisonment should be reconsidered. Tenth Circuit Judge
Harris Hartz shared this idea. In his concurrence to United
States v. Story,96 Judge Hartz argued that rehabilitation should
play at least some role in sentencing a defendant to a term of
imprisonment.97 He discussed the mandate of § 3553(a)(2)(C) in
conjunction with his argument, which directed courts to consider
the need to protect the public from any future crimes the
defendant might commit as a factor when imposing a sentence on
a defendant.98 The idea behind the incapacitation considered

92

Id.
Welch, supra note 9, at 6.
94
Id. at 6–7.
95
Id. at 6.
96
635 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2011). In this case, the defendant was sentenced to
twenty-four months in prison in order to make her eligible for a residential drug
abuse program, and the court prohibited a lengthening of her sentence for this
purpose. Id. at 1243, 1245.
97
Id. at 1249 (Hartz, J., concurring).
98
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (2012); Story, 635 F.3d at 1249.
93
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here, he posited, is directly tied to the concept of rehabilitation.99
“Although rehabilitation is not a proper ground for increasing a
sentence, the threat of recidivism is. And whether one views the
problem as a need for rehabilitation or a need to protect against
recidivism may well depend only on the lens one is looking
through.”100 Therefore, an increased length in prison sentence for
rehabilitative purposes not only furthers the goal of
incapacitation, but also reduces the risk of recidivism, which
Judge Hartz views as a valid sentencing goal.101
The importance of rehabilitation expressed by Judge Hartz is
not lost on other federal judges. In cases like those discussed in
Part II,102 many appeals stem from sentencing judges speaking
about rehabilitation during the proceeding, presumably because
they believe it is an important and relevant justification for
punishment. However, because of the restrictive language in
§ 3582(a) of the SRA, judges are forced to frame their discussion
of rehabilitation as recommendations to the BOP rather than
risk being overturned because they verbally considered the
benefits that rehabilitation might have on the defendant and
society during the sentencing proceeding.103
II. TAPIA AND THE CURRENT CIRCUIT SPLIT
Like the scholars during the later half of the twentieth
century, courts around the country disagree as to the importance
of rehabilitation when sentencing a criminal defendant to a term
of imprisonment. As discussed supra, in Tapia v. United
States,104 the Supreme Court ruled that a sentencing judge can
neither impose imprisonment nor lengthen a term of
imprisonment to promote the defendant’s rehabilitation.105 The
issue Tapia was intended to resolve arose as a result of the
seemingly conflicting uses of rehabilitation in § 3582(a) and
§ 3553(a)(2)(D) and judges’ desire to discuss rehabilitation
despite the apparent prohibition of its consideration in
§ 3582(a).106 Some circuit courts held that § 3582(a) barred
99

Story, 635 F.3d at 1249.
Id.
101
Id.
102
See infra Part II.
103
See infra Part III.
104
131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
105
Id. at 2393.
106
Avila, supra note 14, at 413; Brown, supra note 38, at 388.
100
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courts from considering rehabilitation at all when imposing any
sentence that involved imprisonment,107 while others held that
rehabilitation can be a factor in considering the length of a
sentence; it just cannot be a factor when deciding to sentence a
defendant to imprisonment.108 In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled
on Tapia v. United States in an attempt to resolve this circuit
split and end the conflicting holdings about rehabilitation’s role
in federal sentencing.109
A.

The Supreme Court’s Current Ruling on Rehabilitation and
Sentencing—Tapia

Alejandra Tapia was convicted of smuggling unauthorized
aliens
into
the
United
States
in
violation
of
110
8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(2)(B)(ii) and (iii).
At her sentencing, the
district court imposed a fifty-one-month term of imprisonment to
be followed by three years of postrelease supervision, the
maximum of the forty-one to fifty-one-month recommended
prison sentence as set forth in the United States Federal
Sentencing Guidelines111 (“Guidelines”). In issuing this sentence
the district court judge spoke about why he was imposing the
maximum sentence: “[O]ne of the factors that affects this
[sentence] is the need to provide treatment. In other words, so
she is in long enough to get the 500 Hour Drug Program,”
officially known as the Bureau of Prisons Residential Drug Abuse
Program.112 On appeal, Tapia argued that her sentence was in
violation of § 3582(a), which states that “imprisonment is not an
appropriate means of promoting correction and rehabilitation.”113
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to settle the circuit split
and determine whether, despite the language concerning

107
The holding in Tapia is most analogous to the holdings in the following cases:
In re Sealed Case, 573 F.3d 844, 849–51 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States v. Manzella,
475 F.3d 152, 158 (3d Cir. 2007); United States v. Harris, 990 F.2d 594, 597 (11th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Maier, 975 F.2d 944, 946–47 (2d Cir. 1992).
108
The following cases were overruled by the holding in Tapia: United States v.
Hawk Wing, 433 F.3d 622, 629–30 (8th Cir. 2006); United States v. Duran, 37 F.3d
557, 561 (9th Cir. 1994).
109
Avila, supra note 14, at 413; Brown, supra note 38, at 388–89.
110
8 U.S.C. § 1324 (2012); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385.
111
Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2385.
112
Id.
113
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012).
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rehabilitation in § 3553(a)(2)(D), a sentencing court judge can use
rehabilitative hopes for the defendant as a reason to lengthen the
term of imprisonment under § 3582(a).114
To determine if the district court’s sentence length was
impermissible, the Supreme Court conducted an analysis of what
§ 3582(a) was meant to achieve and reviewed the record for
inconsistencies within that analysis.115 The Court ultimately
held in favor of the defendant, stating, “Section 3582(a) precludes
sentencing courts from imposing or lengthening a prison term to
promote an offender’s rehabilitation.”116 Because the sentencing
transcript, on its face, showed that the district court judge
lengthened Tapia’s sentence based solely on her rehabilitative
needs,117 the judgment was reversed and remanded to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to consider other
issues.118
In its reasoning, the Court noted that § 3553(a)(2) dictates
the four purposes of sentencing as retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation but pointed out that each of
these apply to sentencing differently, or not at all, depending on
the type of sentence being imposed.119 The language of § 3582(a)
instructs judges to consider the factors from § 3553(a)(2), but
explicitly rejects the promotion of rehabilitation as a factor to be
considered when imposing a sentence of imprisonment.120 In
addition, under 28 U.S.C. § 994(k), the United States Sentencing
Commission is charged with the duty of “insur[ing] that the
guidelines reflect the inappropriateness of imposing a sentence to
a term of imprisonment for the purpose of rehabilitating the
defendant or providing the defendant with needed educational or
vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment.”121 Justice Kagan, writing for the majority, said that
the analysis of the issue could end there because the clarity of
the statutes indicates that courts should refer to all of the

114

18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a)(2)(D), 3582(a) (2012); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2386.
See generally Tapia, 131 S. Ct. 2382.
116
Id. at 2391.
117
Id. at 2392.
118
Id. at 2393.
119
Id. at 2387–88; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). Section 3551(b) of the SRA
allows judges sentencing a federal offender to impose sanctions in the form of
imprisonment, probation, or fine. 18 U.S.C. § 3551(b) (2012).
120
18 U.S.C §§ 3553(a)(2), 3582(a) (2012); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2388.
121
28 U.S.C. § 994(k) (2012).
115
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justifications for punishment, except for rehabilitation, when
determining whether to impose imprisonment and, if they chose
to do so, how long the term of imprisonment should be.122
However, the Court went on to address the argument
presented in the opposing amicus brief which said that the word
“recognize,” as it appears in § 3582(a), simply means that a judge
should “not put too much faith in the capacity of prisons to
rehabilitate,” and that rehabilitation can still be considered, to at
least some degree, when determining length of imprisonment, if
not when deciding to impose a sentence of imprisonment in the
first place.123 This argument was quickly struck down when the
Court reiterated the clarity of the language in § 3582(a) and
28 U.S.C. § 994(k) and noted that the word “imprisonment” itself
does not distinguish between the “defendant’s initial placement
behind bars and his continued stay there.”124 The Court noted
that when imposing a term of probation or supervised release,
judges are statutorily entrusted with the power to order a
defendant to participate in a rehabilitation program, but there is
no provision that gives the courts this power during the period of
the defendant’s incarceration.125 The silence of the statute in this
area is cited as evidence of Congress’s intent to deny judges the
capacity to order defendants to participate in prison-run
rehabilitation programs.126
The holding of this case—a judge may not lengthen a
criminal defendant’s sentence of imprisonment based on the need
for rehabilitation127—is clear, but the Court did allow one caveat
to its ruling, saying that a sentencing court does not commit
error by simply discussing opportunities for rehabilitation
available during the length of a defendant’s imprisonment.128
The Court noted that § 3582(a) permits a judge to “make a
recommendation concerning the type of prison facility
appropriate for the defendant”129 and, in that manner, may

122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129

Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2388.
Id. at 2388–89.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a); 28 U.S.C. § 994(k); Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2389–90.
Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2390.
Id.
Id. at 2392.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a).
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encourage the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to place a
particular defendant in a place with access to treatment that
might help the defendant.130
B.

The Post-Tapia Circuit Split

While, as discussed above, Tapia attempted to resolve a prior
circuit split, the Supreme Court’s decision led to continued
disagreement between several circuit courts concerning the level
of consideration the goal of rehabilitation can play in
determining the length of a term of imprisonment before it
becomes Tapia error. Some circuits agree that as long as
rehabilitation is not a “dominant” factor, but merely an
“additional justification” in determining the length of the
sentence of imprisonment, consideration of rehabilitative goals is
permissible, even to increase the length of a defendant’s
sentence.131 Conversely, other circuits interpreted Tapia in a
more literal fashion, holding that rehabilitation cannot be
considered when sentencing a defendant to prison and can only
be discussed so as to recommend a prison facility to the BOP.132
1.

“Additional Justification” and “Dominant” Factor Tests

On one side of the rehabilitation circuit split are the Tenth,
Eighth, and Fifth circuit courts that believe rehabilitation can,
and even should, play a minor role in determining the length of a
defendant’s imprisonment.133 These courts seem to agree with
the Senate Report, that rehabilitation should not be the sole
purpose in sentencing a defendant to a term of imprisonment,
but that rehabilitation is nonetheless an important principle of
punishment that should not be ignored as a justification for
sending a criminal defendant to prison.134
In United States v. Cardenas-Mireles,135 the Tenth Circuit
held that it was permissible for judges to consider rehabilitation
when determining the length of a prison sentence, so long as
130

Tapia, 131 S. Ct. at 2392.
United States v. Receskey, 699 F.3d. 807, 812 (5th Cir. 2012); see also United
States v. Pickar, 666 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir. 2012); United States v. CardenasMireles, 446 F. App’x 991, 995 (10th Cir. 2011).
132
United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760, 767–68 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Gilliard, 671 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 2012).
133
See cases cited supra note 131.
134
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119 (1983).
135
446 F. App’x 991.
131
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rehabilitation was only an “additional justification” as to the
length of the sentence.136 Defendant Cardenas-Mireles was
charged with illegal reentry into the United States from Mexico
after having been deported four times as a result of his forty-four
convictions and seventy-two additional arrests over a period of
three decades.137 The district court judge sentenced him to the
maximum sentence recommended by the Guidelines, ninety-six
months.138 On appeal, Cardenas-Mireles argued that his lengthy
sentence was based on his need for rehabilitation, specifically
medical care, and such a basis was a violation of Tapia and
§ 3582(a).139 In explaining its reasoning for the lengthy sentence,
the district court emphasized the defendant’s recidivist
tendencies, as evidenced by his numerous arrests and
The judge believed that Cardenas-Mireles’s
convictions.140
incapacitation was in society’s best interest.
The defense
centered its arguments on the sentencing judge’s following
statement: “I just cannot bring myself to agree that any
downward departure is particularly relevant here, especially
given [Cardenas-Mireles’s] mental and physical condition.”141
However, in explaining its holding, the Tenth Circuit determined
that the defendant’s “health was, at best, an additional
justification, but not a necessary justification, for the 96-month
sentence.”142
This “additional justification” test adheres to
Tapia’s holding because the district court would have imposed
the ninety-six-month sentence regardless of Cardenas-Mireles’s
need for medical rehabilitation due to his need to be
incapacitated.143 The discussion of his need for such treatment is
permissible under the caveat in Tapia through which a
sentencing judge is permitted to discuss and make
recommendations
concerning
a
defendant’s
need
for
rehabilitation.144

136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144

Id. at 995 (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 992.
Id. at 992–93.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 995.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011).
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The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in United
States v. Pickar.145 In this case, the court held that as long as
rehabilitation was not a “dominant” factor in imposing a
particular sentence length, then its consideration did not result
in error on behalf of the sentencing court.146 The defendant,
Gregg Allen Pickar, was sentenced to a 150-month imprisonment
after being found guilty of bank robbery by a jury.147 Although
the Guidelines recommended a sentence range of 100 to 125
months, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the sentence based on
Pickar’s recidivist tendencies, the danger he posed to the public,
and the need to deter other people in society from committing the
same crimes as Pickar.148 The sentencing judge noted that being
on probation in the past had not dissuaded Pickar from
continuing his criminal tendencies and “that a long sentence is
necessary to provide Mr. Pickar with needed care and
treatment.”149 The Eighth Circuit examined the factors listed in
§ 3553(a), intended to guide a sentencing judge, and determined
that the danger of Pickar’s recidivism and the need to deter the
general public from committing similar crimes were the
“dominant” factors in choosing to impose such a lengthy
sentence.150 Because the sentence passed the “dominant” factor
test, meaning that the need for rehabilitation was not a
“dominant” factor, and in fact, there was no indication
whatsoever that Pickar’s sentence was lengthened on
rehabilitative grounds, the 150-month sentence was affirmed.151
By adopting both the “additional justification” test and the
“dominant” factor test, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v.
Receskey,152 affirmed the defendant, Julie Ann Receskey’s,
sentence of thirty months’ imprisonment upon revocation of her
supervised release stemming from a guilty plea to possession
with intent to distribute methamphetamine.153 Receskey argued

145

666 F.3d 1167, 1169 (8th Cir. 2012).
Id.
147
Id. at 1167–68.
148
Id. at 1168–69.
149
Id. at 1169.
150
Id.
151
Id. at 1169–70 (contrasting the case at hand to Tapia where the trial court
explicitly lengthened the defendant’s sentence in order to ensure that she would be
able to complete a drug treatment program).
152
699 F.3d 807 (5th Cir. 2012).
153
Id. at 808.
146
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that this sentence was unreasonable due to the fact that the
district court violated Tapia by considering her need for
rehabilitation when determining her sentence.154 While the
sentencing judge did discuss Receskey’s need for drug treatment
and expressed a hope that she would receive assistance in that
area from the BOP, a simple discussion of the opportunities that
the defendant would have in prison to pursue rehabilitation is
not Tapia error.155 The Fifth Circuit ruled that, based on the
district court’s discussion, it was clear that the judge was merely
expressing a hope that Receskey would participate in some type
of rehabilitative program.156 The sentencing judge’s concern over
Receskey’s needs may have been an “additional justification” in
imposing the sentence, but any such justification was outweighed
by the “dominant” factor of specific deterrence; the defendant had
violated her supervised release on numerous occasions by testing
positive for drug use and needed to be deterred from committing
further violations.157 To succeed on her appeal, Receskey would
have had to prove that rehabilitation was a “dominant” factor in
the judge’s decision to send her to prison and that it was more
than a simple “additional justification.”158 This is a seemingly
high standard that indicates the Fifth Circuit’s inclination to
allow more discussion of rehabilitation than a strict
interpretation of § 3582(a) and Tapia suggest.
2.

Rehabilitation: A Nonfactor

Where the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits permitted
courts to consider rehabilitation as a factor in determining the
length of a defendant’s terms of imprisonment,159 the Second and
Sixth Circuits adopted a far stricter interpretation of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Tapia and § 3582(a).160 These circuits
interpreted Tapia to mean that the only factors from § 3553(a)(2)
that should be considered when sentencing a defendant to a term

154

Id. at 809.
Id. at 810.
156
Id. at 812.
157
Id. at 808, 812.
158
Id. at 812.
159
See generally 699 F.3d 807; United States v. Pickar, 666 F.3d 1167 (8th Cir.
2012); United States v. Cardenas-Mireles, 446 F. App’x 991 (10th Cir. 2011).
160
See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
155
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of imprisonment are retribution, deterrence, and incapacitation,
constituting a complete ban on rehabilitation as a justification for
imprisonment.161
In United States v. Gilliard,162 the Second Circuit, addressing
the defendant’s claims of a Tapia violation, affirmed the ninetysix-month sentence, holding that the district court applied the
permissible sentencing factors from § 3553(a) and correctly
omitted any consideration of rehabilitation in determining the
length of the sentence.163 The district court imposed an aboveGuidelines sentence of ninety-six months of imprisonment on
Gilliard, who pleaded guilty to “conspiring to distribute and
possess with the intent to distribute heroin.”164 The court based
its decision on Gilliard’s “extensive criminal history,” which
included prior convictions for drug related crimes, and his
tendency to violate the terms of his supervised release.165 The
court specifically stated that it sought to impose a lengthy
sentence to advance the goal of specific deterrence due to
Gilliard’s tendency for recidivism.166 While the district court did
discuss Gilliard’s apparent drug problem and need for treatment,
the judge only discussed rehabilitation by way of recommending
treatment programs to the BOP, rather than considering such
treatment in determining the length of the sentence; therefore
there was no Tapia error.167
The Sixth Circuit held similarly in United States v. Deen168
when it found that the district court impermissibly considered
rehabilitation as a factor in determining the length of Deen’s
imprisonment, in violation of both Tapia and § 3582(a).169 Deen
pleaded guilty to several violations of his supervised release—a
punishment that was part of his sentence for a conviction for
distributing cocaine—including domestic violence and alcohol
use.170 The Guidelines recommend a four to ten-month prison
sentence for such violations; however, the district court imposed

161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170

See, e.g., United States v. Gilliard, 671 F.3d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 2012).
671 F.3d 255.
Id. at 257–59.
Id. at 256–57.
Id. at 257.
Id.
Id. at 259.
706 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 767–68.
Id. at 762.
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a sentence of twenty-four months to “give the Bureau of Prisons
another chance to do some in-depth rehabilitation with Mr.
Deen.”171 The sentencing judge further stated, “[I]t is important
to consider whether the goal of rehabilitation, which I think is
the end game in terms of the criminal justice system, can be best
achieved through incarceration, and it sounds as though maybe it
can.”172 The Sixth Circuit, in overturning Deen’s sentence as
clear Tapia error, reiterated that imprisonment is not a means
by which the goal of rehabilitation should be pursued.173
III. RECONSIDERING REHABILITATION IN PRISONS
There is a large amount of controversy and associated case
law that primarily stems from the original circuit split174 that led
to the ruling in Tapia and the current circuit split.175 The
continuing debate in this area concerning rehabilitation and its
role as a form of punishment when dealing with a sentence of
imprisonment serves as an indicator that the complete
abandonment of the rehabilitative system from the early and
mid-1900s may not have been the best course of action. As
detailed above, the importance of rehabilitation and the
effectiveness of rehabilitative programs were severely
misrepresented during the 1970s when the beginnings of the
retributivist movement began.176 Armed with that knowledge, it
may well be time to revisit and reevaluate the use of
rehabilitation as part of a criminal defendant’s sentence of
imprisonment.
171

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
173
Id. at 767–68. On another appeal concerning the consideration of
rehabilitation in sentencing, the Eleventh Circuit held that “[b]ecause it is
impermissible to consider rehabilitation, a court errs by relying on or considering
rehabilitation in any way when sentencing a defendant to prison.” United States v.
Vandergrift, 754 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2014). The court recognized, as laid out
in Tapia, that rehabilitation can be discussed in a limited manner during
sentencing, but made it clear that anything that could be interpreted as
consideration of rehabilitation constitutes plain Tapia error. This holding is
different from that of the Second and Sixth Circuits because the court found Tapia
error in the judge’s consideration of Vandergrift’s rehabilitative needs, but did not
overrule the sentence because the error did not affect his “substantial rights” and
the “sentence would have been different but for the court’s consideration of
rehabilitation.” Id. at 1311–12.
174
See cases cited supra notes 107–08.
175
See supra Part II.B.
176
See supra Part I.D.
172
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Adopting the Fifth Circuit Test

To resolve the current circuit split and to further the valid
goal of rehabilitation, the Supreme Court should adopt the Fifth
Circuit’s combination of the “additional justification” and
“dominant” factor tests.177 As mentioned above, the Senate
intended § 3582(a) to prohibit rehabilitation from being the sole
principle of punishment considered when sentencing a defendant
to a term of imprisonment.178 This new test would allow judges
to consider a defendant’s rehabilitative needs without the risk of
judges relying on rehabilitation as the only reason behind
sentencing a defendant to prison. The test used by the Fifth
Circuit does not offend the ruling in Tapia because it does not
allow for a sentence to be lengthened for purposes of
rehabilitation only;179 it does allow judges to discuss and consider
rehabilitation as a secondary factor in the reasoning behind
choosing to sentence the defendant to a particular term of
imprisonment as a form of punishment, as opposed to imposing a
fine or a term of probation.180
The Second and Sixth Circuits adhered to Supreme Court
precedent; however, they failed to consider the importance of
rehabilitation to the defendant as an individual and to the
betterment of society as a whole.181 Not permitting a sentence of
imprisonment to be based on rehabilitation at all may increase
the risk of recidivism for some defendants.182 Because of the
unfortunate circumstances which many criminal defendants
come from and return to upon their release from prison, the
benefits of the deterrence and incapacitation these individuals
were subjected to during their term of imprisonment can be
washed away without the additional benefits of rehabilitation to

177

See United States v. Receskey, 699 F.3d 807, 812 (5th Cir. 2012).
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119 (1983).
179
See Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382, 2392 (2011).
180
Receskey, 699 F.3d at 812.
181
United States v. Deen, 706 F.3d 760, 767–68 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v.
Gilliard, 671 F.3d 255, 256 (2d Cir. 2012). The Sixth Circuit recognized that there is
a growing trend back towards understanding and embracing rehabilitation in
prisons as a benefit to both defendants and society; however, the court felt bound by
the Supreme Court precedent from Tapia, and therefore, prohibited the district
court from considering rehabilitation in any manner when determining the length of
Deen’s term of imprisonment. Deen, 706 F.3d at 768–69.
182
Welch, supra note 9, at 3–4.
178
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help reduce the risk of recidivism.183 Allowing judges to consider
and talk about rehabilitation freely as an “additional
justification” when sentencing a defendant to a term of
imprisonment, but only allowing deterrence, incapacitation, and
retributivism to be the “dominant” factors in determining the
length that sentence, would help to reduce this risk of recidivism,
and therefore help both the defendant and society.
B.

Allowing Judges To Speak About Rehabilitation: Amending
§ 3582(a)

Alternatively, if the Supreme Court is unwilling to adopt the
Fifth Circuit test, it may be the case that a more drastic measure
is needed to balance the importance of rehabilitation and the
statutory language in § 3582(a). Therefore, Congress should
adopt the Eighth Circuit’s “dominant” factor language into the
statute. With that small change the relevant language would
read: “recognizing that imprisonment [may not be a dominant
factor in] promoting correction and rehabilitation.”184 This would
allow judges openly to pursue the valid goal of rehabilitation, as
referenced in § 3553(a)(2)(D), without offending Congress’s
original intention that rehabilitation not be the sole factor
considered when sentencing a defendant to a term of
imprisonment.185
The purpose of the contested language of § 3582(a) is valid
and should be maintained. In limiting the use of rehabilitation
when imposing a term of imprisonment, Congress wanted to
“focus attention on the specific purposes of the sentencing process
and assure that adequate emphasis is given to each.”186 Congress
believed that a greater emphasis should be given to the goals of
deterrence, incapacitation, and retribution in an effort to elevate
the importance of the protection of society from criminal activity,
but that does not mean that Congress intended to exclude
rehabilitation from being given any consideration whatsoever.187
This change to the statute would not offend Congress’s original

183
Id. (acknowledging that rehabilitation is not a cure-all and that not all
defendants can or will be rehabilitated, but noting that there is enough
rehabilitative success to warrant a change in the system).
184
18 U.S.C. § 3582(a) (2012).
185
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (2012); S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119 (1983).
186
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 119.
187
See id.
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intention because the “dominant” factor language inherently
implies that rehabilitation is prohibited from being the sole
justification for sentencing a defendant to a term of
imprisonment, allowing deterrence, incapacitation, and
retribution to have more substantial weight in the sentencing
decision.188
In all of the district court cases discussed above, the judges
were talking about rehabilitation, and whether or not their
respective sentences were overturned depended on the circuit
courts’ interpretations of how much that discussion weighed in
determining the length of the term of imprisonment.189 Tapia
allows judges to discuss rehabilitation so long as they are
recommending a particular facility to the Federal Bureau of
Prisons (“BOP”) in which an individual defendant will have
access to the specific treatment that defendant may need, but the
time needed to complete these programs may be longer than the
time the defendant is sentenced to be in prison.190 Not being able
to complete a rehabilitative program will not allow the
defendant, upon release back into society, to take advantage of
the full benefits rehabilitative programs have to offer, whether
they be drug treatment, medical treatment, or even educational
and vocational programs.
This problem concerning balancing the need for
rehabilitation against the other principles of punishment could
be resolved if the wording of § 3582(a) were modified so as to
permit some degree of consideration to rehabilitation when a
defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment. While this
would create a fairly large change to the plain meaning of the
statute, it is better to allow judges to speak freely concerning the
defendant’s rehabilitative needs than for judges to keep quiet for
fear of being overturned and perhaps silently allowing too much
consideration to be given to rehabilitation, leading to an increase
in prison populations and a depletion of rehabilitation resources.
This change would permit rehabilitation to be used when
necessary to help a defendant who is going to be sent to prison
anyway and would maintain the prohibition against sending
defendants to prison solely so that they are forced to enroll and
complete a rehabilitative program.
188
189
190

Id.
See supra Part II.B.
See generally Tapia v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2382 (2011).
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CONCLUSION
In promoting rehabilitative goals, not only would individual
defendants benefit from the help and training they might receive
while in prison, but society would benefit as well. Allowing
defendants more time to complete rehabilitative programs while
in prison would lead to less recidivism upon release, resulting in
a safer society. Adopting the Fifth Circuit test or, alternatively,
amending the language of § 3582(a), would allow you, as a judge,
to sentence the defendant, Jamie, to thirty-two months in prison
in the hope that she would be able to complete the drug
treatment program and would be less inclined to commit more
drug crimes in the future, assuming that your primary
considerations for that sentence were incapacitation and
deterrence. Both solutions elevate the role of rehabilitation when
sentencing a defendant to a term of imprisonment without
offending Congress’s intention to prohibit rehabilitation from
being the sole justification for sending a defendant to prison.
This would promote the valid goals of rehabilitation, espoused by
Congress when writing the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, and
maintain the importance of the other principles of punishment by
helping to reduce the risk of recidivism among defendants who
are released back into society.

